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![http://web.stratfor.com/images/latinamerica/map/Drug_routes_2010_800.jpg?fn=3216243241> The New Federation and Los Zetas Tensions between the Gulf cartel and their former partners Los Zetas finally escalated into open warfare in early February. Reports indicate that the rift between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas started over the Jan. 18 murder of Los Zetas No. 2 Miguel “Z 40” Trevino Morales’ right-hand man and fellow Zeta leader, Sergio “El Concord 3” Mendoza Pena. Allegedly, an altercation between Mendoza and Gulf cartel No. 2 Eduardo “El Coss” Costilla Sanchez’s men resulted in Mendoza’s murder. After learning of Mendoza’s death, Trevino gave Costilla an ultimatum to hand over those responsible for Mendoza’s death by Jan. 25. The deadline came and went, and Trevino ordered the kidnapping of 16 known Gulf cartel members in the Ciudad Miguel Aleman area as retaliation. From that point, tit-for-tat actions have seen the Gulf-Zeta conflict expand throughout the Tamaulipas border region, as well as the formation of a new alliance known as the New Federation<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100308_mexico_security_memo_march_8_2010?fn=7016243251>. The New restore balance and stability to Mexico’s security environment<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100407_mexico_struggle_balance?fn=9416243292> . Juarez Juarez, Chihuahua state, remains the most violent city in Mexico. The conflict between the Juarez cartel and the Sinaloa Federation has raged for nearly two and a half years. The struggle has taken many forms, from cartel-backed street gangs battling each other block by block, to the military and federal police battling for control of the city from the cartels. Dramatic changes in the operating environment in Juarez have emerged thus far in 2010. In one important change that has greatly affected Juarez, security responsibility nationwide has been transferred from the Mexican military to the federal police. Mexican President Felipe Calderon sees the cartel wars as falling within the jurisdiction of law enforcement, but the extent of the corruption in the country’s federal police upon his 2006 arrival in office forced him to rely on the military for the brunt of security operations against the cartels until January. After extensive reforms in the federal police, newly trained and vetted federal police agents took over all aspects of security operations within Juarez city limits, including the city’s emergency call center (similar to the 911 centers in the United States). The military now operates in rural, open areas outside the city, where their training and equipment is better suited. The effectiveness of this new strategy remains to be seen. The Mexican government will re-evaluate aspects of the federal police strategy in December. As it stands right now, no significant arrests have been made and the violence in the greater Juarez area is on pace with the levels seen in 2009. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department announced Feb. 24 that Washington plans to embed intelligence agents and operatives in the Juarez Intelligence and Operations Fusion Center. About a month later, on March 22, Mexican war college head Gen. Benito Medina said that he believed Mexico needed international aid in the fight against the cartels. Having U.S. personnel operate openly in Mexico would touch on strong political and cultural sensitivities, something that has stood in the way of increased U.S. operational aid to Mexico. Medina’s statement shows, however, that sentiment in Mexico could be changing. At the very least, it suggests there may be room for maneuver around the issue. Shortly after Medina’s comments, a U.S. intelligence report leaked April 8 that the Sinaloa Federation had taken over primary control of drug trafficking in the Juarez area from the Juarez cartel. The information was later confirmed by the FBI. The intelligence report cited information from confidential informants involved in the drug trade and the noticeable shift in the proportion of Sinaloa drugs being seized on the U.S. side of the border. This does not mean the Juarez cartel is out of commission, but rather that it has lost control of its core turf. The Juarez cartel’s core geography is centered around the Juarez Valley, which stretches from Ciudad Juarez along the Texas border down to El Porvenir. It maintains some degree of influence throughout the rest of Chihuahua. The loss of the Juarez cartel’s home turf leaves the organization without a place to retreat to, and the cartel has made it very clear that it will stand and fight to the death. Indeed, violence has spiked yet again in the region in recent weeks since the announcement of the Sinaloa takeover, with 20 executions on April 28 alone, and an April 24 ambush attack on a federal police patrol that killed six federal agents and a teenage bystander. The Juarez area has already seen more than 870 drug-related murders in 2010 (there were about 2,700 deaths there in 2009). [image: Mexican Drug Cartels: An Update] (click here to enlarge image) <http://web.stratfor.com/images/northamerica/map/5-17-10_Mexican-drug-cartels-map_manufacturing_v5.jpg?fn=3816243233> It has become clear that the Sinaloa Federation is the dominant organization in the area, as it appears to have superior funding and manpower. This leaves little hope that the Juarez cartel can reclaim its plaza. The only hope the Juarez cartel has of remaining relevant on the Mexican drug trafficking scene is to come to some sort of agreement with the Sinaloa Federation. Despite the extreme violence witnessed in recent years between the two organizations, such an agreement is not out of the question. Before this recent conflict, the Juarez cartel was part of the Sinaloa Federation for some five years. That said, an agreement does not appear likely in the near future, meaning violence in the Juarez area will likely persist as the Juarez cartel struggles to hold on to what little territory and market share it still has. Targeting U.S. Interests A series of attacks and probes directed against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in some of the most violent regions in Mexico began after the Feb. 24 announcement that U.S. Intelligence analysts and operatives would be embedded in the Juarez Joint Intelligence and Operations Fusion Center. The first incident came in the form of a bomb threat phoned in to the U.S. Consulate in Juarez between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. March 2. The threat reportedly resulted in the evacuation of nearly 1,000 people from the consulate premises. Even hoax bomb threats are dangerous, as they get people out of the protective zone of the consulate building and into the open, where they are more vulnerable. The second incident occurred on March 3 when several masked gunmen in two SUVs posing as Nuevo Leon state police attempted to enter the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey in what appears to have been a probe of U.S. Consulate security. An actual Nuevo Leon state police agent charged with guarding the consulate stopped the masked gunmen, who departed after a tense 15-minute standoff. The U.S. Consulate in Monterrey was also the target of a haphazard drive-by shooting and failed grenade attack in October 2008<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081013_mexico_security_memo_oct_13_2008?fn=6816243244> . The third, and most notable, incident involved the execution of three people associated with the U.S. Consulate in Juarez<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100315_mexico_security_memo_march_15_2010?fn=3616243223>at the hands of members of Los Aztecas street gang, which has ties to the Juarez cartel. The victims included a husband and wife who were both U.S. citizens. The wife, Lesley Enriquez — who was four months pregnant — worked at the Juarez consulate, where she approved visa applications. Her husband, Arthur Redelfs, was a corrections officer at the El Paso County Jail across the border in Texas. The third victim, Jorge Alberto Salcido Ceniceros, was married to a Mexican national employee of the consulate. The motive behind the attack has yet to be established, with conjectures still ranging widely. Some claim Redelfs was the true target because of his connection to the El Paso County Jail, while others maintain that Enriquez was targeted for rejecting cartel members’ incomplete visa applications. According to still another proposed motive, a Los Aztecas member testified to Mexican federal police that U.S. government employees were specifically targeted to draw the United States into the cartel conflict in the hopes that U.S. involvement would neutralize the Mexican government’s alleged favoritism of the Sinaloa federation<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100407_mexico_struggle_balance?fn=3116243287>. In a fourth incident, unknown suspects hurled a fragmentation grenade over the wall of the U.S. Consulate compound in Nuevo Laredo<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100412_mexico_security_memo_april_12_2010?fn=2716243231>on April 9 at approximately 11:00 p.m. local time; the suspects then fled. There were no injuries, and only minor damage was reported. The Nuevo Laredo consulate and the Piedras Negras consular agency were subsequently closed April 12-13 as investigations were launched and the security of the facilities was assessed. No individuals were named as suspects in the attack, but it is widely suspected that Los Zetas were responsible. National Security Reform On April 28, the Mexican Senate passed the National Security Act, a set of reforms that effectively redefine the role of the Mexican military in the cartel wars. Since Felipe Calderon became president in December 2006, the most effective security force at his disposal has been the Mexican military. The use of military troops against drug trafficking organizations, however, has raised questions about the legality of deploying the armed forces domestically<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090729_role_mexican_military_cartel_war?fn=8416243280> . Outlook In the coming months, violence associated with the fluid nature of the cartel landscape should steadily increase. With the impending Zeta offensive, already high levels of violence could spike yet again, particularly in the Tamaulipas region. Despite a change in strategy in places like Juarez, Mexican security forces have yet to demonstrate the ability to clamp down on these warring criminal groups enough to reduce violence by any meaningful amount. As mentioned, STRATFOR expects the Mexican military to continue to play an integral role in the war against the cartels. Mexico’s three main political parties will be closely watching the outcome of Calderon’s strategies in the coming weeks and months, and will try to leverage these outcomes for political gain in the upcoming 2012 Mexican presidential elections. With Calderon’s legacy riding on the outcome of the Mexican government’s offensive against the cartels, Mexico City might explore other options, including seeking additional foreign help, especially as the resistance to foreign involvement seems to be starting to fade. *Give us your thoughts on this report* For Publication<http://www.stratfor.com/contact?type=letters&subject=RE%3A+Mexican+Drug+Cartels%3A+An+Update&nid=162432> Not For Publication<http://www.stratfor.com/contact?type=responses&subject=RE%3A+Mexican+Drug+Cartels%3A+An+Update&nid=162432> *Read comments on other reports* Reader Comments <http://www.stratfor.com/letters_to_stratfor> -- roger w From Proverbs: Under three things the earth trembles, under four it cannot bear up: a servant who becomes king ... ---------------------------------------------------------- Explore printed work at: http://www.prliving.ca/ View the growing list of video work at: http://revver.com/find/video/?query=LastonLastof&search_on=owners](http://web.stratfor.com/images/latinamerica/map/Drug_routes_2010_800.jpg?f){kind=link}